INTRODUCTION
Agricultural trade policy continues to be at the forefront of international controversy at both the multilateral level and on various regional fronts. Meaningful agricultural trade liberalization is likely a necessary condition for any significant multilateral agreements in the ongoing Doha Development Round at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Within the Asia-Pacific region, a number of bilateral trade agreements implicate agricultural support and trade policies in varying degrees. It is evident that Japan, Korea, and other East Asian economies remain relatively closed to trade in food, while protection is also high in certain agricultural products in the United States, Canada, and Australia.
An important, and sometimes overlooked, feature of farm policy is that agriculture is a technologically dynamic sector. Agriculture is in the midst of two ongoing technological revolutions --crop genetics and livestock industrialization --and is in the early stages of a third --gene modification through recombinant DNA. These technological changes have a number of implications. First, the evolution of large agrobusiness firms devoted to life science has generated substantial industrial concentration and vertical integration in the sector. Second, while research in agricultural product development is increasingly undertaken in the private sector, the relationships between public research agencies and private firms in establishing basic scientific results are growing in complexity. Third, there is increasing product innovation through the development of new plant and animal varieties, biologically based inputs for agriculture, and crop-based nutritional and pharmaceutical goods.
Taken together, these factors mean that the industry places growing reliance on formal means of protecting new technologies, including intellectual property rights (IPRs), and there are strong interests pushing for further strengthening and international harmonization in this regard. There are three major forms of IPRs that affect such protection and the willingness to invest in agricultural technologies. These are patents on life forms, plant variety rights, and geographical indications. In this paper, I offer a largely qualitative analysis of such issues. While paying some attention to the interests of developing countries in East Asia, the emphasis is on the main players in Asia-Pacific trade and production in agricultural goods: the United States, Canada, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. In the next Section, I discuss essential technological changes in agriculture and some basic issues they raise. In Section Three I explain the nature of IPRs in agriculture, including the policy environment in major countries. In Section Four I look at the economic interests of these countries by considering information on endowments, technology, production, and trade.
In Section Five I conclude by taking up the question of linkages between IPRs and other supports, including trade policy and agricultural subsidies. Included are observations about the scope for regional policies and reforms in the WTO.
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE
It is remarkable that standard international trade and investment models view agriculture as a competitive industry with constant returns to scale and static technologies.
In fact, each of these characterizations is inadequate in many ways, at least outside the poorest developing countries.
Modern agriculture is subject to considerable technological change, rising concentration among farms and agribusiness firms seeking economies of scale and scope, and is the beneficiary of massive public research subsidies and output or price supports. These characteristics matter in the formulation of trade policies and IPRs.
To see that agriculture is technologically dynamic, consider the research-intensive nature of many globally marketable crops. Technological progress arises from efforts to improve breeding and growing methods, develop new seed varieties, and engineer plants and animals to display such beneficial traits as pest resistance, higher yields, and nutritional gains. Thus, hybridization of plant strains involves selecting and combining desirable characteristics across species through cross-fertilization and asexual reproduction. Maize, sorghum, and potatoes, among other crops, long have benefited from this research. Breeding techniques based on sexual propagation characterize many other forms of plant varieties, including produce and ornamental flowers and trees.
Agricultural biotechnology goes beyond this stage to injecting genetic material (recombinant DNA) from other, perhaps unrelated, plants and animals into particular species in order to develop new varieties with specific characteristics. Major crops now produced with bioengineered technologies include soybeans, cotton, rice, and potatoes.
Animals are also increasingly the subject of biotechnological applications, with the greatest progress existing in dairy production and fish farming. The newest manifestation of agricultural biotechnology involves field testing of so-called nutriceutical plants, the products of which are designed to arrive at the consumer's table with a built-in combination of nutrition and medical benefits.
Agricultural production is characterized also by two further forms of technological change. First is the increasing industrialization of livestock production, involving the concentration of large numbers of animals into specific locations and the application of antibiotics to sustain animal health and hormones to promote rapid growth.
Such industrialization is increasingly common in beef, pork, poultry, and fish farming.
Second is the increasing tendency of crops to be differentiated in terms of appearance, quality, and production characteristics (including organic foods) in order to generate higher value added per unit produced. This trend is especially prevalent as regards processed foods and beverages, and particularly in the increasingly globalized wine industry.
Each of these activities involves the application of extensive research funds and scientific personnel to both basic science (such as biogenetic research tools) and applied agriculture (such as seed varieties, livestock antibiotics, and extension services). In consequence, there is a complex mix of public research support and private development work in all areas of agricultural technology. This mix, and the attendant gains from investments in technology, vary considerably across countries and affect the economic interests that nations have in international trade and technology policy. Further, the types of IPRs used in each of these areas are different across products and countries, generating pressure for further policy reform and harmonization. To illuminate these facts the discussion turns next to a deeper discussion of technological change, competition, and
IPRs in the Asia-Pacific region.
a. Agricultural Technology in the Asia-Pacific Region
Traditional agricultural methods involves farmers selecting and cultivating the most successful plant strains from natural landraces and then exchanging seeds in informal markets. This tradition remains in place in rural regions of the poorest countries but is not much in evidence among the middle-income and high-income economies of the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, these economies are characterized by the purposeful application of science to the selection and improvement of crops in order to achieve the massive productivity gains that have benefited rising populations.
The development of high-yielding modern crop varieties dates from the late 19 th century with the advent of scientific breeding technologies in North America and Europe (Evenson, 2004) . Hybridization methods in maize spread through these areas relatively quickly and later were applied to sorghum, millet, and rice varieties (Griliches, 1957) .
Hybridization techniques were adopted successfully by the private sector in the absence of legal intellectual property protection because hybrids produce a one-generation "heterosis" effect that precludes the germination of saved seeds, forcing farmers to pay for new seeds each season (Goeschl and Swanson, 2000) . Other forms of breeding that generated new varieties of wheat, other grains, flowers, and produce did not carry their own technological protection of this kind, leading to industry pressures within the United
States for the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (Watal, 2001) . Other countries in the region followed later, as noted below.
The international diffusion of modern crop varieties into Asian developing economies is most closely attributed to the Green Revolution, under which rice and wheat varieties bred for stability and strength by public agricultural institutions were introduced and improved in various regions, beginning in the 1960s. Diffusion of new varieties continued to grow through the 1990s and, by that decade, modern strains had dominated agricultural production in Asia (Evenson, 2004 (Huang et al., 2002 ).
There are four major GM crops in commercial production today, including soybeans, maize, cotton, and canola, though trials are under way in many other products.
The global diffusion of such crops, at least in terms of area planted, has been remarkable.
From a base of zero hectares in 1995, the global area of transgenic crops grew to almost 70 million hectares in 2003 (James, 2003) . However, this has taken place in only 18 countries and only ten have devoted more than 50,000 hectares to GM crops. In the AsiaPacific region, the United States is by far the largest producer, followed by Canada, China, and Australia. China in particular has been a recent and enthusiastic adopter of GM technologies. It is anticipated that Chinese farmers will have a 92 percent adoption rate of Bt cotton and a 95 percent adoption rate of GM rice by the year 2010 (Huang et al., 2002 (Dhar 2002 ).
There are other important suppliers in Asia, including the Beijing Seed Corporation (China), Mitsubishi (Japan), Takii (Japan), and Charoen Pokphand (Thailand) (Kuyek, 2001) . However, the science-based agricultural inputs industry is dominated by corporations from the developed countries. Asian developing countries, including China and Korea, lag considerably in the development and registration of new technologies in this area and remain net importers.
A second feature is that R&D in the agricultural life sciences is increasingly undertaken by private firms, rather than public research institutes, in the developed market economies. To be sure there is a substantial role played by governments in the United States, Canada, and Japan in funding basic research in genomics, genetic tools, and recombinant technologies. However, the U.S. biotechnology industry has been built on applications undertaken by private firms, often spun off from university laboratories under terms of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Successful technologies developed in this fashion generally have been gathered into the ambit of larger corporations through acquisitions. Indeed, the U.S. government considers the privatization of even basic research results to be a valuable form of international competitive advantage (Barton and Maskus, 2004) . Thus, the fruits of its research subsidies ultimately find their way into private channels of production, trade, and investment.
This privatization of agricultural research raises concerns in some quarters about potential impacts on costs for farmers in poor countries and on sustainable development (Dutfield, 2000) . These concerns are compounded by the diminished relative presence of national research services and international agricultural research centers (IARCs) in developing new agricultural technologies (Evenson, 2004) . Nonetheless, Korea and Japan have moved toward greater reliance on private firms for commercializing agricultural research, and China actively has sought to establish quasi-private biotechnology enterprises associated with government laboratories and universities (Maskus, 2004) .
The third feature of the technology intensity of modern agriculture is the growing reliance on intellectual property protection to ensure the appropriability of returns to investment in R&D. Both plant varieties (other than hybrids) and biotechnological inventions are extreme cases of technologies on which it is extremely difficult to practice technical exclusion. This is obvious in the case of new plants, for harvested seeds automatically embody the technology for future propagation. Thus, without legal protection of some kind, the introduction of new plant varieties quickly generates a large pool of potential free riders (farmers), thereby diminishing up-front incentives for research. For their part, many biotechnological products are easily reverse engineered through the application of genetic techniques. IPRs are so central to competition in these industries that it is important to review the main forms of protection.
THE PROTECTION AND REGULATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

a. The Role of IPRs
With this complexity of technological change, participants, and demand patterns, a complicated set of public policies is required to support the movement of technologies from laboratories to embodied products on the market. A central and critical policy is the set of IPRs, which set out the boundaries within which their owners have exclusive rights to produce, sell, and license a technology or product. For an economy seeking to develop and benefit from its agriculture, biotechnology, and agribusiness industries, IPRs provide the framework for balancing several objectives.
First, costs of inventing and marketing new seed varieties and bio-engineered plants and foods are high, because of research expenditures, uncertainty of outcomes, and costly and lengthy testing and approval procedures. In order for inventors to recover these R&D costs, there must be some form of market exclusivity because appropriability of market returns is an acute problem. Biotechnologies have a natural appropriation problem because they have qualities that make imitation by others feasible at relatively low costs. This problem is easily seen in the agricultural sector. Innovative plant varieties, as embodied in seeds, may be readily reproduced in identical qualities simply by virtue of cultivating the plants. Thus, new plant varieties may face competing production and sales simply by being placed on the market in the first place, an act that carries an implicit license for replication and production without enumerated rights (Swanson, 2002) . Intellectual property rights (IPRs), primarily in the forms of patents and plant variety protection, therefore provide the exclusivity needed to earn returns to invention and innovation. Patents are critically important for this purpose in the biotechnology sector (Barton, 2002; Maskus, 2000) .
A second purpose of IPRs is to provide incentives to bring new technologies and products to the market in order to achieve consumer and industrial benefits. While public research programs may be effective at developing new knowledge, universities and public laboratories in the past have been ineffective at commercializing it through embodied products, a situation that remains true in much of the developing world and transition economies, including China (Maskus, 2004) . In recognition of this difficulty, Japan is far stronger now than it was 20 years ago, reflecting their status as major developers and net exporters of intellectual assets. Standards in middle-income economies and poor countries tend to be weaker, for they perceive few interests in protecting the rights of foreign technology developers and may see weak IPRs as a form of industrial policy to promote local firms (Maskus, 2000) . Nonetheless, China and Korea have adopted strong intellectual property protection in anticipation of developing sophisticated technology.
b. Forms of Intellectual Property Protection
The IPRs of most relevance to agriculture and agribusiness include patents, plant variety rights (PVRs), trade secrets, and geographical indications, which we describe briefly here. A patent provides its owner the right to exclude all others from making, selling, importing, or using the product or process named in the patent without authorization for a fixed period of time. It provides exclusive rights to the physical representation, in the forms of goods, formulas, and designs, of ideas with industrial applicability.
For an invention to be patentable it must meet three criteria: it must be novel (that is, previously unknown), it must contain an inventive step (that is, a step that is non-obvious to one skilled in the area of technology it represents), and it must be useful or have industrial utility. Novelty and non-obviousness are important for they set the technical bar that patent examiners must certify has been met in order to award protection. The utility standard is also important because it essentially determines the dividing line between basic research discoveries, which are generally unpatentable outside the United States, and applied inventions.
Patents are provided for a fixed length of time, a minimum of 20 years from the filing date under the TRIPS agreement. The breadth or scope of the patent may vary.
Inventors make claims about the protectable novelty of their inventions but examiners may narrow the claims or modify or reject them. While the claims recognized in a patent grant establish the literal terms of protected subject matter, patent scope may be complemented by a legal "doctrine of equivalents". This doctrine permits patent owners to litigate against competing products and technologies that may be shown to rely on techniques that are essentially equivalent to those in the patent grant.
The market power associated with patents may impose social costs even as it encourages invention and commercialization. Accordingly, patents are limited in duration and breadth. They carry disclosure requirements and, in many nations, must be worked in order to sustain protection. The severity of these limitations varies across countries.
Moreover, the potential for abusing the market power inherent in patent grants is recognized in national competition policies. Attempts to extend protection beyond the patent grant are considered anti-competitive and may be subject to antimonopoly remedies.
Surveys performed of corporate research managers in the United States tend to find that patents are less important than other factors in decisions about whether to undertake R&D in technologically complex products, though they are useful for encouraging technological rivals to cross-license (Cohen et al., 2000) . However, the major sectors in which the promise of patents is relied upon for undertaking R&D and attracting capital are pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, including the biotechnology components of both industries. One prominent observer claims that without patents the biotechnology industry could not develop (Barton, 2002 Trade secrets provide protection for any information (whether patentable or not) that has economic value and is prevented from disclosure by firms through reasonable efforts. Trade secrets may be critical for biological materials that are not sold, but rather used in production. Examples include a microorganism used to make a drug or a parent line used to make a hybrid. The commercial advantage of trade secrets in these cases is that the inventor is not required to publish the protected information. TRIPS requires countries to set out laws defining the nature of unfair competition in this area, with the intention of raising the costs of learning technical business secrets through permissible reverse engineering and encouraging labor mobility.
Geographical indications (GIs) are a final form of IPRs of interest to agriculture. A geographical indication is a name, word, logo or other mark that identifies a product as having originated in a particular region, locality, or country, where reputation or some quality characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to that origin. GIs most readily attach to wines and spirits, though they are relevant for foods, food products, tobacco products, or other agriculturally based goods. By providing enterprises located within a region the exclusive rights to display the regional name on their products and marketing, GIs offer incentives to improve or safeguard these inherent quality characteristics. In turn, such products should command a price premium on the marketplace, generating larger value added per unit sold. Many see this as a mechanism for raising incomes in agriculturally based developing economies, though the major users at present are European nations.
There is a dual structure of protection for GIs in the TRIPS Agreement. The most general obligation is that countries must permit interested parties to use legal means to prevent the identification or presentation of a good that would mislead consumers as to its true geographical origin and to prevent acts of unfair competition in this regard. 4 WTO Members also must provide for refusal or invalidation of trademarks containing misleading geographical indications. These general requirements must be afforded any product for which GI protection might be sought. However, terms that are generic within a territory need not be awarded GI protection and countries are not required to recognize
GIs that are not protected in their country of origin or have fallen into disuse there. A second important area is the application of safety principles to genetically modified foods. The United States, Canada, and China are enthusiastic producers of GM foods but subject firms to meeting bio-safety rules as regards nutrition and the environment. Japan and Korea do not produce GM foods and subject imports to rigorous rules governing maximum share of GM inputs and labeling requirements. They may choose to follow the European Union in asserting rules for tracking the separation of GM products and non-GM products. Thus, such rules significantly affect the prospects for economies to expand exports of bio-engineered foods. Indeed, the Cartagena Protocol d
. An Overview of Policy Approaches
A brief review of policy stances in the major Asia-Pacific countries in the area of IPRs is in order. For this purpose, the laws of each country are summarized in Table 1.   6 As might be expected, the United States has the strongest protection regime for agricultural IPRs. It provides patents on higher-order life forms and, within the area of biotechnology, permits broad patent claims on genetic discoveries (such as genetic 5 Mexico has a small amount of land under experimental cultivation (James, 2003) . 6 Readers should note that there are exceptions and modifications in such laws, and these characterizations are not always entirely valid.
sequences and specific genes) and research tools in addition to exclusive rights on GM products. The United States permits both patents and PVRs on new plant varieties, including those developed from genetic engineering, though patents apply only to plants that reproduce asexually. Moreover, its plant variety law conforms to UPOV 1991 and therefore significantly restricts the ability of rival breeders to use protected plants in research as breeding stock or germplasm. As for geographical indications, the United
States offers no specific protection for these devices. Rather, companies within a region are free to register certification marks, which certify origin with no necessary relationship to quality characteristics. Indeed, the United States is opposed to their extension beyond wines and spirits at the WTO, believing that trademarks and certification marks offer sufficient incentives for the development of niche foodstuffs.
Japan's system of IPRs in agriculture is close to that of the United States, reflecting the recent convergence in its laws with American laws and the general strengthening of the Japanese regime (Maskus, 2002 , Nagaoka, 2005 . Japan strongly protects plant varieties with both PVRs and patents (on both sexually and asexually reproducing plants), reflecting the interests of its horticultural industry. However, it relies on trademarks and unfair competition laws to prevent misleading application of geographical names to products. Korea's system has also converged on that of the United States, especially as regards certification marks for protecting place names. Korea does not yet award patents to genetic discoveries.
China's regime is designed to encourage innovation in agricultural biotechnology, while retaining strong regard for follow-on competition. Thus, China does not offer patents for genetic methods, though it does do so for GMOs. Plant varieties are protected under the weaker terms of the 1978 UPOV Convention, permitting a breeder's research exemption and the farmer's privilege. Finally, Canada and Australia follow similar regimes. Canada does not patent plant varieties but does offer patents on novel and inventive plant cells. As befits its high-quality wine industry, Australia protects geographical indications in wines, largely as a result of a bilateral arrangement on this subject with the European Union.
Overall, while there are noteworthy differences in these approaches to protecting technology in agriculture, the various regimes in these countries offer strong protection for inventors and plant developers. In this context, differences in IPRs per se are not likely to be significant distortions to trade and investment in foods and food products in the region.
ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIES
a. Production and Trade
Some basic perspective on the agricultural economies of major Asia-Pacific economies is provided in Tables 2 and 3 . 7 As may be seen in Table 2 , rice is grown in large quantities in all of the seven countries listed. Thailand and Vietnam devote the largest land areas per capita to rice paddy and are major producers, trailing only China with its massive scale. Despite its large allocation of land to rice cultivation, Korea produced on average only 6.9 million metric tons of rice. Japan produces larger quantities, but rice farmers in both Korea and Japan evidently display lower productivity than do farmers elsewhere. This is borne out by the figures on international trade in Table 3 , which show that those two countries are major net importers of rice, despite the extensive protection and support for rice producers (Table 4) . Korea and Japan also produce virtually no maize, wheat, soybeans, and cotton, procuring their needs from imports.
In contrast, the United States is a significant net exporter of grains, cotton, and beef (Table 3) , though it retains extensive producer subsidies for wheat, maize, and rice.
The United States is a net importer of sugar, which is heavily protected, fruits and vegetables, and fish and seafood. Thailand and Vietnam are large net exporters of fish and seafood, much of it to the United States, a factor underlying recent U.S. antidumping actions in catfish and shrimp. The growth of production and exports in this sector in
Vietnam since the late 1990s has been extraordinary.
China is a large producer of all the commodities listed except cotton, and that product has grown rapidly since the introduction of Bt cotton (Huang et al., 2002 ).
China's trade picture in agriculture is mixed across commodities, with surpluses in rice, maize, fruits and vegetables, and fish and seafood, while experiencing deficits in wheat, sugar, soybeans, cotton, and beef. Rapid economic growth since 2002 presumably has increased China's net import positions, particularly in wheat and soybeans.
With the exception of China, the countries in Tables 2 and 3 It is impossible to discuss agricultural trade without recognizing the extensive protection from imports and production subsidies that affect production and exchange.
Tables 4a through 4c provide recent computations of various measures of protection. In Table 4a are producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for OECD members in the group studied here. These are made up of market price supports and payments based on outputs or area planted as a percentage of total farm income. Japan and Korea provide the most extensive support, ranging up to 89 percent for Korean oilseeds producers and 86 percent for Japanese wheat and rice farmers. The United States and Canada offer significant support as well, most of it tied to production. Within this group of countries only the United States pays export subsidies, an element of central concern in the Doha Round negotiations.
The figures in Table 4b reflect estimates of average border protection in different crops. These figures are bound tariff rates averaged across tariff lines, incorporating both primary and processed products. Measured this way, protection in the United States, Canada, and Australia is slight, with the exception of sugar. Korea has high bound tariff rates in wheat, cereals, oilseeds, and fruits and vegetables, though its applied tariffs are presumably lower. Thailand has bound tariff rates in agriculture that range from 17 percent in cotton to 49 percent in sugar. Finally, the estimates for China are based on actual price wedges from a variety of interventions (Anderson et al., 2004 ) that combine to form nominal rates of protection. These estimates suggest that China strongly protects sugar, cotton, and oilseeds but penalizes rice, meats, and fruits and vegetables slightly. It should be noted that China intends to move toward a tariff-rate quota system that is likely to raise the average nominal protection for these commodities by 2007 (Anderson et al., 2004 ).
The bound tariffs in Table 4b are misleading about true levels of protection because they fail to account for the tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) that abound in agricultural tariff lines. Thus, in Table 4c , I list average in-quota and over-quota tariff rates for products subject to TRQs in North America and the Asia-Pacific region. It is evident that within-quota rates seem moderate in North America, ranging from two percent in cotton to 28 percent in sugar, but import levels beyond the quota restraints encounter significant increases in tariff rates. Both in-quota and over-quota rates tend to be higher in the AsiaPacific area. Whether the higher over-quota rates matter depends on the fill rates for specific quotas, though it is likely that the higher over-quota taxes act as a deterrent to actual fulfillment.
Overall, this review of trade restrictions suggests that agricultural production and trade remain subject to significant distortions from government policy. Negotiating reductions in these barriers is likely to be extremely difficult without some offsetting gains in other aspects of trade regulation, one candidate for which is intellectual property protection.
b. Innovation and Intellectual Property
Each of the major countries considered in this paper has extensive public research programs in place in agriculture, ranging from basic genetic and biotechnological research activities to applied extension services. Japan, for example, has a public agency, the National Agricultural and Bio-oriented Research Organization, which manages five regional research institutes and six specialized research institutes. Research centers at Nagoya University, University of Tokyo, and other institutions work on developing agricultural technologies and methods of transferring technology to industry and farming, including through the registration and licensing of IPRs. China has established linkages among its public research laboratories and universities in order to develop agricultural and medical biotechnologies and to improve biosafety regulations. In the past Chinese public research agencies have been ineffective at commercializing their inventions , but in recent years their ability to transfer technology has improved.
The United States has devoted the most resources to agricultural technology development and has a deep innovation system ranging from research-intensive landgrant universities to government extension services and research laboratories and on to farmers, agribusiness firms, and agro-biotechnology companies. This broad approach to developing knowledge and applied agricultural technologies implies that the sector is R&D intensive and employs far more labor and capital than a straightforward listing of numbers of farmers would imply. It also implies that the United States remains the major source of agricultural technologies on a global scale.
To appreciate the relative success of major Asia-Pacific economies in agricultural innovation, consider the figures in Tables 5 and 6 . The first two columns in Table 5 show the numbers of plant variety certificates in place in 1998 and 2002. As noted above, the United States permits plant developers to choose plant variety protection or patent protection (or both) on new strains. There was a sharp increase in the number of both forms of protection granted in the United States over this period. U.S.-resident developers filed far more applications, and received more certificates, than foreign developers. It is interesting to note, however, that the number of applications fell in this period, while the number of patent applications rose sharply, especially on behalf of nonresidents. Indeed, in 2002, more patents were issued to non-residents than to residents, attesting to the global nature of this industry. Japan awards the largest number of plant variety certificates of all the countries in the list, the great majority of which go to Japanese inventors. However, there was a large increase in certificates issued to nonresidents.
The plant variety protection laws in China and Korea are relatively new but both have attracted significant increases in applications and registrations. China as of 2002
had not issued any certificates to foreign residents, who experience some difficulties in application procedures (Maskus, 2004) . Korea saw a dramatic increase in applications
for PVRs between 1998 and 2002 by non-residents. Canada and Australia have also witnessed significant increases in non-resident applications and grants. The overall impression from Table 5 is that there is significant growth in innovative activity in developing new plant varieties, including biotechnological strains, and in protecting those inventions within the Asia-Pacific region. Japanese developers are especially active in registering for protection at home.
The figures in Table 6 relate patent grants awarded over the period 1997-2001 in the United States for those patent classifications most relevant to agriculture. Also listed is a measure I call "revealed technology advantage", which is defined as: RTA = {(P ij /P iw )/(P j /P w ) .
This ratio calculates the share of country j's patents in classification i of global patents in classification i, divided by the share of country j's patents in global patents (where global means all patents taken out in the United States). The measure is precisely analogous to the standard measure of revealed comparative advantage in trade and is designed to find out if a country tends to register a disproportionately higher share of patents in a particular technology classification than it does overall in the United States. A ratio greater than one suggests a technological specialization in that category.
Patent classification 047 is plant husbandry and is the closest (though narrower)
category to the plant variety patents listed in Table 5 . The United States received by far the greatest number of patents in this category over the period and has a revealed advantage in it. Japan registered 69 plant husbandry patents, which was the largest number of any foreign country, but its RTA suggests that Japanese inventors tend to specialize in non-agricultural technologies. 8 Similar comments apply to China and Korea, which together registered only one patent. In contrast, Canada and Australia display large RTAs in plant husbandry. The situation across countries is the same in category 119, animal husbandry.
Category 424, bio-affecting drugs, involves agricultural drugs as a component but is broader than just farming. Japan again registered a large number of patents but did not achieve an RTA. In contrast, China's RTA demonstrates a significant specialization in this area as regards technological resources. Also interesting in this context is category 800, multicellular living organisms. While these organisms are generally not patentable outside the United States and Japan, all countries considered have registered patents in the former nation. While the number is small, China's RTA suggests also a relative specialization in this area of technology, as do those of Canada and Australia. Again, Japan and Korea display technological disadvantages in developing new organisms.
The picture supported by this review of innovation data is the following.
Japanese inventors are active in all areas of agricultural technology, including biotechnology, and register large numbers of plant variety certificates in particular.
However, in the aggregate Japanese invention is not specialized in these areas, at least as On this basis it is sensible to infer that all the countries in this sample share an interest in protecting intellectual property, though Korea and China remain more in the form of technology followers in these areas of knowledge. As a result, these countries may have greater interests in limiting the scope of patent protection in order to enhance access to newer technologies. At the same time, China has decided to promote biotechnology in agriculture as a means of achieving rapid productivity gains and food security. Attracting these technologies from abroad and moving them from public laboratories to the marketplace presume the existence of well specified IPRs.
LINKING IPRS TO TRADE POLICY
The point of assessing the state of trade protection and IPRs in agriculture in this paper is essentially to bring out some relationships between them that are relevant for (Zigic, 2000) .
The risk is real that farmers in high-cost economies with lagging technologies will suffer greater competitive pressures from both trade liberalization and tight IPRs. While this description may most readily describe the current situation in such low-income economies as Vietnam and China, it applies as well to Japan and Korea, where farms tend to be small and inefficient. The latter countries have few options in terms of limiting intellectual property protection and, as a result, may be even more resistant to opening up to imports. In contrast, the major agricultural exporters are also net developers of technology, as noted in Table 6 . The United States, Canada, and Australia presumably have strong interests in greater market access for agricultural goods within the region to complement their gains from exploiting intellectual property.
While this analysis suggests a sharp difference of interests in the region, in truth the situation is more complex. After all, the essential purposes of protecting IPRs are to encourage domestic innovation, promote market development and licensing to enhance information diffusion, and to increase access to domestic and foreign technologies. To the extent these outcomes emerge, a country's farming sector should become more Many Asian economies recognize the scope for innovation that is provided their farmers through the implementation and registration of geographical name protection, whether through certification marks, collective marks, or geographical indications. Just as one essential purpose of plant variety rights is to increase the return to differentiating products in ornamental plants, produce, and trees, value can be created for specific localities through the use of such names. Australia gains from a system of GIs in wines, permitting entrepreneurs in that country to trade on such names as Coonawarra and Barossa (Anderson, 2000) . The United States remains opposed to extending the GI system globally, in part because of the current use in its market of names that could become reclaimed property in such a world. It would seem, however, that developing countries, including China, and even Japan and Korea would have little to fear from extending such protection in order to encourage innovation and product development among their own farmers.
A final related challenge must be to rationalize the use of food safety standards and technical requirements in order to increase market access and expand market opportunities abroad (Maskus and Wilson, 2001) . It is likely that regional economies rely at times on arbitrary product standards to limit import competition in food and agriculture, a charge frequently leveled at Japan in particular. While such standards may have a protective impact, they are impediments to rationalization and the introduction of more globalized technologies. The most glaring example is the EU ban on imports of GM foods, mirrored by the rigorous labeling and tracking standards in Japan and Korea.
Such restrictions tend to limit investments in exporting countries and limit the spread of technology. Indeed, a potential ban on GM trade in Northeast Asia would have significantly negative impacts on Chinese welfare while limiting consumer choice in Japan and Korea (Anderson and Yao, 2001 ).
b. Global IPR and Trade Negotiations
What might be said about the interests of the major Asia-Pacific economies in the intellectual property area, in light of potential regional and global agricultural trade liberalization? A number of conclusions seem sensible from the foregoing analysis.
First, there is a broad similarity of intellectual property policies and objectives among the richer economies of the region. While there is a sharp distinction in comparative advantage in agriculture, and therefore differing interests in pushing for cuts in border measures and farm supports, each of these countries the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Korea -sees advantages in promoting technological progress in the rural sector. For Japan and Korea the challenge may be particularly acute as regards modernizing and rationalizing its farm sizes and agricultural practices. However, IPRs, especially plant variety rights and some forms of geographical name recognition can assist the transition. Indeed, given Japan's presence in developing new plant varieties, a significant export opportunity could be provided by stronger global protection.
For its part, the government of China stresses the importance of modern agriculture for food security and rural development, supporting its encouragement of biotechnology adoption. China and the United States share a mutual interest in reducing international resistance to genetically modified agricultural products. In that regard they may wish to coordinate efforts in making sure that potential labeling requirements in major world markets are not onerous even as they push for greater market access.
However, there are significant differences within the region. Where such pressures could come to a head quickly is in the ongoing negotiations at WIPO concerning a global Patent Law Treaty, which aims to harmonize patent eligibility and examination standards in all WIPO members (Barton, 2004) . The announced goal of those discussions is to reduce patent transactions costs through harmonization of procedures and concentration of patent examinations in a small number of national or regional offices. However, both the United States and the European Union seek aggressively to export their patent standards to other economies. In this context, it would be inadvisable for the developing economies of East Asia, including China, to accede to an agreement that established such standards. Even Japan, Korea, and Australia could be disadvantaged by the increasingly broad scope of patent protection it would bring to key agricultural technologies.
Overall, then, while there is some scope for making tradeoffs between agricultural trade liberalization and intellectual property reform, the nations of the Asia-Pacific region do have somewhat separate interests as regards linking these areas. Significant thought needs to be devoted to these issues as negotiations proceed. Anderson et al., (2004), and WTO (2003) . Advantages, 1997 Advantages, -2001 
